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CIVIL RIGHTS
Overview
Five decisions rendered by the Tenth Circuit during the 1986-1987
survey period in the area of civil rights addressed a number of important
issues arising from the context of employment discrimination. In decid-
ing these rather diverse issues, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals gen-
erally relied on cautious, conservative interpretations of statutory,
regulatory, and case law resulting in largely predictable conclusions.
Sex discrimination was examined in two distinct contexts: "no-
spouse" rules under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 (Title VII)
and parental or marital status under Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments of 19722 (Title IX). The court affirmed a ruling of no discrimina-
tion based on sex under a company "no-spouse" rule in Thomas v.
Metroflight, Inc. 3 In so ruling, the court reviewed the efficacy of statistical
analysis of the disparate impact standard. The dismissal of a claim of
sex discrimination arising from a termination based in part on the em-
ployee's parental or marital status brought under Title IX was affirmed
under the principal of issue preclusion in Mabry v. State Board of Commu-
nity Colleges and Occupational Education.4 In addition, the court established
the application of Title VII substantive standards to Title IX employ-
ment discrimination claims.
Age discrimination was examined in the application of mitigation
principles to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 5 (ADEA) in Gi-
andonato v. Sybron Corporation.6 In that case, an employee's rejection of
reinstatement offers made by the employer was held to end the accrual
of back pay damages.
Freedom of speech under the first amendment was considered in
Wren v. Spurlock 7 in which the court, employing a classic balancing of
interests, affirmed a damages award to a public school teacher arising
from a violation of her first amendment rights. In another first amend-
ment case, the court reversed a damages award to a county employee in
Ewers v. Board of County Commissioners of the County of Curry.8 Applying ba-
sic due process principles, the Ewers court also reversed damages based
on deprivation of a liberty interest in reputation.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
2. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1982).
3. 814 F.2d 1506 (10th Cir. 1987); see infra notes 19-37 and accompanying text.
4. 813 F.2d 311 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 148 (1987); see infra notes 38-69
and accompanying text.
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982).
6. 804 F.2d 120 (10th Cir. 1986); see infra notes 70-98 and accompanying text.
7. 798 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1287 (1987); see infra notes
99-137 and accompanying text.
8. 802 F.2d 1242 (10th Cir. 1986), reh'g granted in part, 813 F.2d 1583 (1987), cert.
denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3460 (1988); see infra notes 138-72 and accompanying text.




No-spouse rules are a common means by which employers seek to
avoid nepotism in their employment practices. Typically, no-spouse
rules prohibit hiring spouses of employees or retaining both spouses
after co-workers have married. Most no-spouse rules are facially neu-
tral, often allowing co-workers who marry to choose who will quit or
terminating the spouse with less seniority in the absence of a choice. 9
No-spouse rules exist throughout the employment spectrum, affecting
blue-collar, white-collar, and professional employees alike, as well as all
sizes of employers. Several reasons are given for the necessity of no-
spouse rules: (1) spousal problems are brought into the workplace;
(2) spousal morale is affected when one spouse is dissatisfied; (3) fair-
ness is questioned when one spouse supervises the other; (4) spouses
may be favored during lay-offs; (5) scheduling of shifts, vacations, and
leaves creates problems; (6) discipline of a spouse may create problems;
(7) tardiness and absenteeism may be compounded by spouses commut-
ing together and; (8) spouses may disregard the safety of others in emer-
gencies. 10 With the reasonable exception of supervisory situations,
commentators question the validity of these reasons in the face of dis-
crimination based on marriage which prevents the employment of quali-
fied workers.' I
Despite their facial neutrality, no-spouse rules frequently discrimi-
nate against women. 12 Challenges to no-spouse rules have generally
been brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964'3 (Title
VII), which prohibits discrimination based on sex in employment.
14
Although the United States Supreme Court has yet to consider no-
spouse rules, the circuit courts have encountered no-spouse rules in a
9. Wexler, Husbands and Wives: The Uneasy Care for Antinepotism Rules, 62 B.U.L. REV.
75 (1982); Comment, (Mrs.) Alice Doesn't Work Here Anymore: No-Spouse Rules and the American
Working Woman, 29 UCLA L. REv. 199 (1981).
10. Kovarsky and Hauck, The No-Spouse Rule, Title VII, and Arbitration, 32 LAB. L.J. 366,
368-69 (1981).
11. Bierman and Fisher, Antinepotism Rules Applied to Spouses: Business and Legal View-
points, 35 LAB. L.J. 634, 636 (1984); Kovarsky and Hauck, supra note 10, at 368.
12. Wexler, supra note 9, at 92; Comment, supra note 9, at 202; Kovarsky and Hauck,
supra note 10, at 369; see also Yuhas v. Libby-Owens Ford Co., 562 F.2d 496, 498 (7th Cir.
1977) ("substantial discriminatory impact" established when 71 of 74 applicants excluded
by no-spouse hire rule were women), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934 (1978); EEOC Dec. 75-239,
EEOC Dec. 1983 (CCH), Par. 6492, at 4260-61 (March 2, 1976) (discrimination estab-
lished where 65 of 66 women applicants were rejected because of no-spouse rule); World
Airways, 74-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) Par. 8655, at 5471 (1975) (in all cases where em-
ployer applied its no-spouse rule, except present case, the women had resigned).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(a) (1982) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex or national origin. ...
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handful of cases. In Harper v. Trans World Airlines,15 the Eighth Circuit
ruled that the plaintiff had insufficient proof to establish discrimination
under a no-spouse rule where four out of five applications of the rule
resulted in job losses to women. However, in Yuhas v. Libby-Owens Ford
Co.,' 6 the Seventh Circuit held that "substantial discriminatory impact"
was established where seventy-one out of seventy-four applicants ex-
cluded by a no-spouse rule were women.
Discrimination under Title VII can be proved by a showing of either
disparate treatment, where an employer intentionally treats employees
or applicants differently, or by a showing of disparate impact, where
facially neutral employment practices result in adverse effects. The
United States Supreme Court ruled in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 17 that a
showing of disparate impact alone was sufficient to establish a prima fa-
cie case of discrimination. Once the plaintiff has established a prima
facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to show that the
employment regulation or practice in question is justified by business
necessity. 18
2. Disparate Impact: Thomas v. Metroflight, Inc.
In a case of first impression, the Tenth Circuit held in Thomas v.
Metroflight, Inc.,' 9 the plaintiff had provided insufficient evidence to es-
tablish prima facie sex discrimination under Metroflight's no-spouse
rule. The holding demonstrates the difficulty of proving the discrimina-
tory nature of no-spouse rules, particularly in small business settings.
Metroflight, Inc. is a small commercial airline with about 500 em-
ployees. Thomas was a secretary at Metroflight working twenty-five per-
cent in the flight operations department and seventy-five percent in the
maintenance department when she married a Metroflight pilot working
in flight operations. Metroflight's no-spouse rule prohibits spouses
from working in the same department and allows affected employees to
choose which spouse will quit. If no choice is made, Metroflight then
fires the spouse with less seniority. Neither Thomas nor her husband
quit, so Metroflight fired Thomas since she had less seniority. 20 Prior to
Thomas' firing, co-workers at Metroflight had married eight other times.
In seven instances, the no-spouse rule was not violated because the em-
ployees worked in different departments or the company accommodated
them by either allowing one to transfer departments or simply ignoring
enforcement. In the remaining instance, the female employee was
fired.
2 1
15. 525 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1975).
16. 562 F.2d 496, 498 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934 (1978).
17. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
18. International Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n. 15
(1977).
19. 814 F.2d 1506 (10th Cir. 1987).
20. Id. at 1507-08.
21. Id.
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a. Analysis
Since the challenged practices or regulations characterizing most
no-spouse rules are facially neutral, disparate impact must be demon-
strated by statistics. 22 In the context of a large business or institution, a
no-spouse rule may be shown to be discriminatory simply by examining
the actual number of women versus men affected by application of the
rule.23 However, no-spouse rules may be infrequently applied by
smaller businesses, resulting in statistically insignificant numbers of em-
ployees affected. 24 This was precisely the circumstances under which
Thomas was brought. In such a situation, the plaintiff must rely on other
forms of statistical proof to establish a prima facie case. For instance,
the plaintiff can compare the number of employees affected to a larger
relevant population such as the analogous population of the surround-
ing metropolitan area.2 5 In Thomas, since the sample of two women
fired in two applications of the no-spouse rule was too small to be statis-
tically significant, the plaintiff employed a statistics expert to analyze po-
tential applications of the no-spouse rule to the entire employee
population of Metroflight.2 6 Despite the expert's testimony, the court
ruled that Thomas had only presented evidence sufficierit to prove that
salary or seniority were controlling factors in a couple's decision as to
who would quit, but that Thomas had not established that salary or sen-
iority were in fact the predominantly controlling factors.
2 7
In light of the United States Supreme Court decision in Dothard v.
Rawlinson2 8 and the Eighth Circuit's decision in Harper v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc.,29 it is unfortunate that the Tenth Circuit demanded a
higher standard than the simple existence of disparate impact. The
Supreme Court first applied the Griggs disparate impact analysis to sex
discrimination in Dothard,3 0 holding that the disparate impact of a
height/weight regulation on the general female population was suffi-
cient to show discriminatory impact. 3 1 Addressing a no-spouse rule, the
Harper court required that the plaintiff prove disparate income potentials
to establish disparate impact.32 The Thomas court, however, additionally
demanded that the plaintiff prove that salary or seniority actually con-
trolled the decisions of affected employees. The bottom line of a no-
22. See generally Wexler, supra note 9, at 98-110; Comment, supra note 9, at 217-24.
23. See Yuhas v. Libby-Owens Ford Co., 562 F.2d 496, 497 (7th Cir. 1977); EEOC
Dec. 75-239; EEOC Dec. 1983, at 4260.
24. See Harper v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 525 F.2d 409, 412 (8th Cir. 1975).
25. See Wexler, supra note 9, at 101-02; Comment, supra note 9, at 222-24.
26. 814 F.2d at 1510. Thomas established statistically that considering all possible
marriages between employees in the same departments, more women than men would
terminate on the basis of preserving the higher salary and seniority. Based on a universe
of 3687 possible marriages, women had lower salaries in 62.1% and less seniority in
52.4% of the possibilities.
27. Id. at 1510-11.
28. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
29. 525 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1975).
30. 433 U.S. at 328.




spouse rule is the criteria by which one spouse is terminated by the em-
ployer. In the instant case, the deciding factor was lower seniority.
Thomas made a successful showing that a significantly higher number of
women had lower seniority in the universe of possible interdepartmental
marriages, thus establishing potential disparate impact.3 3 That showing
should have been sufficient for a prima facie case of discrimination
under the standard of Griggs and Dothard.
b. Implications
The decision in Thomas is a clear example of the difficulty plaintiffs
will continue to encounter when trying to demonstrate the disparate im-
pact of no-spouse rules, particularly in small business settings. This is
unfortunate because no-spouse rules not only discriminate in their own
right against women, but also tend to perpetuate other forms of sexual
inequality as well. Where couples choose which spouse will terminate,
the choice will most often be the woman because men tend to have
higher seniority, higher salaries, and better advancement potential, all of
which would be considered significant factors.3 4 Also, many couples will
choose for the woman to terminate regardless of their relative status
because they prefer the husband to support the family. 35 Thus, by de-
nying women the chance to advance their employment status, no-spouse
rules tend to reinforce the stereotypical roles of women as unequal in
the working place.
The court claimed it affirmed on the issue "reluctantly because we
suspect ... that 'no-spouse' rules in practice often result in discrimina-
tion against women .... .. 36 This observation was perhaps a veiled
implication that a legislative solution would be a superior method of
dealing with no-spouse rules, particularly in view of the small business
context. An amendment to Title VII proscribing no-spouse rules by
prohibiting discrimination based on marital status is one viable solution
which would still allow employers to control supervisory circum-
stances. 3 7 However, until such legislation becomes reality, women dis-
criminated against under no-spouse rules will bear difficult burdens of




Title IX of the Education Amendments of 197238 (Title IX) was en-
33. 814 F.2d at 1510 n. 4. Although the court disputed "whether a statistically signifi-
cant disparate impact is in all cases legally significant," it conceded that a showing of
52.4% women having lower seniority was statistically significant under Hazelwood School
Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n. 14 (1977).
34. Comment, supra note 9, at 224.
35. Id.
36. 814 F.2d at 1509.
37. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 9, at 237.
38. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1982).
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acted for the purpose of eliminating discrimination on the basis of sex in
educational institutions receiving financial assistance from the federal
government.3 9 It was patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
196440 (Title VI), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, and national origin in programs receiving federal fund-
ing. Both Title VI and Title IX are enforced through the ultimate sanc-
tion of funding termination. 4 1 Under Title IX, however, any agency
providing federal financial assistance to an educational institution is also
authorized to promulgate regulations designed to insure adherence to
Title IX's non-discrimination goals.4 2 Pursuant to Title IX's authoriza-
tion of such regulatory power, the Department of Education (ED) in
1975 issued regulations governing the operation of federally funded ed-
ucational institutions. 4 3 Included were regulations which specifically ad-
dressed employment discrimination, an area not expressly provided for
in the implementing legislation.
44
Six United States courts of appeals subsequently handed down con-
flicting decisions on the validity of the ED's Title IX employment regula-
tions.4 5 The Second Circuit alone ruled that the ED's regulations were
valid as promulgated and within the scope of Title IX in North Haven
Board of Education v. Hufstedler.46 In order to resolve the conflict among
the circuits, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
ruled that the ED does have authority to regulate employment and pro-
39. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982) provides in pertinent part: "No person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance ......
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982).
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1981); 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1982).
42. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1982).
43. The regulations were actually issued by the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare (HEW). However, in 1979, the Department of Education (ED) assumed the func-
tions of HEW relating to Title IX. 20 U.S.C. § 344 1(a)(3) (1982).
44. Contra Title VI, which expressly excludes employment from its coverage. 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1982). For text of the regulations relevant to the instant
case, see infra note 56 and accompanying text.
45. Four of the federal courts of appeals ruled that employment regulation was not
within the scope of Title IX. See Seattle Univ. v. United States Dept. of Health, Educ. and
Welfare, 621 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1980) (gender discrimination in salaries paid to faculty
members in School of Nursing), vacated sub. nom., Bell v. Dougherty County School Sys.,
456 U.S. 986 (1982); Romeo Community Schools v. United States Dept. of Health, Educ.
and Welfare, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.) (school refuses to alter maternity leave policy to
conform to ED's regulations), cert. denied 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Junior College Dist. v.
Califano, 597 F.2d 119 (8th Cir.) (discrimination in salaries), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972
(1979); Islesboro School Committee v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (Ist Cir.) (pregnancy not
treated in same manner as other temporary disabilities by school's leave of absence pol-
icy), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979). The Fifth Circuit ruled that although employment
could be regulated under Title IX, ED's regulations were invalid because they did not limit
the regulated employment to positions directly funded by federal monies. See Dougherty
County School Sys. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1980) (salary supplement paid to
industrial arts teachers, but not to home economics teachers), vacated sub. nom., Bell v.
Dougherty County School Sys., 456 U.S. 986 (1982).
46. 629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd sub. nom., North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456
U.S. 512 (1982). Two Connecticut school systems challenged ED's regulatory authority in
North Haven. Alleged discrimination related to maternity leave policy, job assignments,
working conditions, and renewal of employment contracts.
450 [Vol. 65:4
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hibit discrimination based on sex by educational institutions receiving
federal funding under Title IX.
4 7
2. Interaction of Title IX and Title VII: Mabry v. State Board of
Community Colleges and Occupational Education
The Tenth Circuit held in Maby"8 that a claim of discrimination
based on sex was not actionable under Title IX where brought in addi-
tion to a claim under Title VII which was unsuccessful at the trial level. 4
9
The holding ultimately strengthens and clarifies Title IX's application to
employment.
50
The plaintiff, Patricia Mabry, was employed as a physical education
instructor and coach at Trinidad State Junior College (Trinidad) from
1974 to 1982. She was terminated from her position at Trinidad due to
a reduction in force necessitated by declining enrollment at the college.
Two other instructors in the department, both male and with greater
seniority than Mabry, were retained. The President of Trinidad,
Thomas Sullivan, conceded that one factor in his decision to terminate
Mabry was that the other two instructors were married and had fami-
lies.5 1 After exhausting all administrative remedies available to her, Ma-
bry brought suit under Title VII, Title IX, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Sullivan, the State Board of Community Colleges and Occupational Ed-
ucation, and its individual members. She sought damages, reinstate-
ment with back pay and benefits, attorney's fees, and costs. 5 2 On
defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, the district court dis-
missed the Title IX and § 1983 claims on the grounds that the areas in
which Mabry taught were not federally funded programs within the
meaning of Title IX, and that the sufficiency of remedies under Title IX
precluded suit under § 1983. 53 Subsequently, in deciding the Title VII
claim, the district court found that Mabry's termination was not based
on discriminatory consideration of her sex, regardless of any considera-
tion given to marital or familial status. Mabry chose to appeal only the
dismissal of the Title IX claim.
5 4
47. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982). For discussion of North
Haven, see Note, Title IXApplies to Employees, 5 CAMPBELL L. REV. 249 (1982); Comment, Title
IV as a Toolfor Eliminating Gender-based Employment Discrimination at Educational Institutions, 14
N.C. CENT. L.J. 215 (1983); Note, Title IX Proscribes Sex-based Employment Discrimination in
Federally Funded Education Programs, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 117 (1983); Comment, "Person"
in Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments Includes Employees of Federally Funded Programs-
HEWV Regulations to Enforce Title IX are Valid, 12 U. BALT. L. REV. 548 (1983); Comment, Title
IX and Employment Discrimination: North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 17 U. RIcH. L. REV.
589 (1983); Comment, Employment Included in Title IX, 22 WASHBURN L.J. 131 (1982).
48. 813 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 1987).
49. Id. at 314.
50. See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
51. 813 F.2d at 313.
52. Id.
53. Mabry v. State Bd. for Community Colleges and Occupational Educ., 597 F. Supp.
1235 (D. Colo. 1984).
54. 813 F.2d at 313.
1988]
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a. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming the trial court, based
its decision on three primary factors: (1) that the discrimination claim
based on marital status was actionable under Title VII; (2) that the regu-
lation under Title IX prohibiting discrimination based on marital status
was overbroad; and (3) that the finding of no discrimination under Title
VII by the trial court precluded the litigation of the same issue under
Title IX. In her appeal on the dismissal of the Title IX claim, Mabry
argued that her allegation of discrimination based on marital, familial,
or wage earner status was not actionable under Title VII according to an
EEOC guideline which stated that such policies were relevant only
where discrimination was ultimately based on sex. 55 Mabry then relied
on the Title IX regulation relating to marital, familial, parental, or wage
earner status to support the viability of her discrimination claim under
Title IX. The regulation states:
(a) General. A recipient shall not apply any policy or take any
employment action:
(1) Concerning the potential marital, parental, or family
status of an employee or applicant for employment which treats
persons differently on the basis of sex;
(2) Which is based upon whether an employee or applicant
for employment is the head of a household or principal wage
earner in such employee's or applicant's family unit.
56
The court rejected her argument, reasoning that subsection (1) treats
discrimination based on marital, parental, or family status precisely the
same as Title VII because discrimination is ultimately based on sex.
Thus, if Mabry based her claim on subsection (1), the claim would nec-
essarily be actionable under Title VII. 5 7 If, however, Mabry based her
claim on subsection (2), it would at first appear that a distinct right of
action based solely on head of household or principal wage earner status
was available. The court foreclosed this argument, however, by holding
that Mabry's interpretation of subsection (2) was overbroad. 5 8
In reaching that decision, the court began with the principle that in
order for a regulation to be valid, it must be "reasonably related to the
enabling legislation. ' '5 9 The court then pointed out that Title IX pro-
hibited discrimination on the basis of sex, but that the regulation pro-
hibited conduct that did not necessarily result in sex discrimination.
55. Id. at 314. The guidelines referred to appears at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.4(a) (1986),
which states:
The Commission has determined that an employer's rule which forbids or re-
stricts the employment of married women and which is not applicable to married
men is a discrimination based on sex prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act. It does not seem to us relevant that the rule is not directed against all fe-
males, but only against married females, for so long as sex is a factor in the appli-
cation of the rule, such application involves a discrimination based on sex.
56. 34 C.F.R. § 106.57 (1986).
57. 813 F.2d at 315.
58. Id. at 315-16.




The court thus concluded that Mabry could not rely on her interpreta-
tion of subsection (2) because it imposed a standard broader than that of
the enabling statute.
60
According to the court, then, the only claim available to Mabry
under Title IX was that she was discriminated against on the basis of her
sex, a claim clearly actionable under Title VII. Since the district court
found no sex discrimination under the Title VII claim actually brought
by Mabry, she was therefore precluded from raising the identical issue
under Title IX by fundamental preclusion principles. 6 1 In order to
come to that conclusion, however, the court stated that the substantive
standards used to determine discrimination must be the same under
both Title VII and Title IX. 62 The question of applicable substantive
standards under Title IX has scarcely been discussed by the courts.
63
The Tenth Circuit reasoned that since Title IX's application to employ-
ment essentially duplicates the purpose of Title VII, and since a well-
developed body of case law exists concerning Title VII, the substantive
standards of Title VII logically apply to Title IX. 64 Thus, the court con-
cluded that "Title IX certainly sweeps no broader than Title VII.
' 6 5
Consequently, it held that Mabry was not entitled to an additional op-
portunity to prove discrimination under Title IX based on the identical
facts of her Title VII claim.
66
b. Implications
Discrimination claims brought under Title IX, particularly those in-
volving employment, represent a confusing and evolving area of civil
rights law. The Tenth Circuit's decision in Mabry provides both clarifi-
cation and orientation for Title IX claims. Germane to the impact of
Mabry is the court's adoption of Title VII substantive standards to Title
IX claims. 67 At first blush this development appears to thwart the appli-
cation of Title IX to employment discrimination claims; however, sex
discrimination is actually more easily established with the express adop-
tion of Title VII substantive standards. This is so because the plaintiff
need only show disparate impact to establish discrimination and need
60. Id. at 316.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Although under Title VII discrimination need only be proved by disparate impact,
see supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text, the Seventh Circuit ruled in Cannon v. Uni-
versity of Chicago, 648 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981), that dispa-
rate intent must be shown in a Title IX claim. However, the Supreme Court upheld a
showing of disparate impact under Title VI, on which Title IX is patterned, in Guardians
Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983). Additionally, EEOC regulations state
that agencies shall "consider Title VII case law . . .in determining whether a recipient of
Federal financial assistance has engaged in an unlawful employment practice." 28 C.F.R.
§ 42.604 (1986).
64. 813 F.2d at 317.
65. Id. at 318.
66. Id.
67. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
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not show disparate intent. 68 Once discrimination is successfully estab-
lished, Title IX's powerful sanction of funding termination may be in-
voked in addition to Title VII's equitable remedies. 69 Thus, by allowing
a plaintiff to employ the same substantive standards under both Title
VII and Title IX, the Mabry decision more effectively discourages em-
ployment discrimination based on sex in federally funded educational
institutions. Although the plaintiff in Mabry did not successfully estab-
lish sex discrimination, future plaintiffs will have a more clearly defined
task of how to do so and, ultimately, easier access to Title IX's powerful
remedies.
II. MITIGATION AND THE ADEA
A. Background
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act 70 (ADEA) was adopted
by Congress in 1967 for the purpose of eliminating discrimination by
employers on the basis of age. Passed only three years after Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 196471 (Title VII), the prohibitory provisions of
the ADEA parallel those of Title VII, and the primary goal of both acts is
to end discriminatory employment practices. 7 2 A major difference be-
tween the two acts, however, is the way in which the acts are enforced.
Whereas Title VII provides only for equitable "relief," 73 the ADEA pro-
vides for "such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of
this Chapter."' 74 Furthermore, the ADEA expressly incorporates the
remedies and procedures of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 193875
68. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
70. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982).
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
72. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1982). In pertinent part, the legislation states:
(a) Employer practices. It shall be unlawful for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would de-
prive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this
chapter.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
74. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (1982).
75. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). In pertinent part the legislation states:
The provisions of this chapter shall be enforced in accordance with the pow-
ers, remedies, and procedures provided in sections 211 (b), 216 (except for sub-
section (a) thereof), and 217 of this title, [sections 11 (b), 16 and 17 of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938] and subsection (c) of this section.
For general discussion of ADEA remedies, see Marion, Legal and Equitable Remedies Under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 45 MD. L. REV. 298 (1986); Nosier and Wing, Remedies
under the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 62 DEN. U.L. REv. 469 (1985); Rich-
ards, Monetary Awardsfor Age Discrimination in Employment, 30 ARK. L. REV. 305 (1976); Com-
ment, Coming of Age: Unique and Independent Treatment of the ADEA, 7 Am. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
583 (1984); Note, Damage Remedies under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 43 BRooK-
LYN L. REV. 47 (1976); Comment, Age Discrimination: Monetary Damages Under the Federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 58 NEB. L. REV. 214 (1979); Comment, Damages in Age Dis-




Although the ADEA officially adopts the FLSA remedies, 76 many
courts have chosen to follow Title VII precedent due to the similarities
of the non-discrimination goals of the two acts. While this practice
causes considerable confusion in some areas, it is not illogical. Since the
FLSA primarily addresses problems related to unfair wage and hour
practices, its remedial procedures are at times poorly suited to discrimi-
natory practices. Mitigation of damages by the plaintiff is not addressed
by either the provisions of the ADEA or the incorporated provisions of
the FLSA. Title VII, however, explicitly states that back pay be set off by
amounts "earnable with reasonable diligence."'7 7 Therefore, the courts
have been forced to turn to Title VII precedent in considering mitiga-
tion issues.
78
The United States Supreme Court held in Ford Motor Co. v. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission79 (EEOC) that, absent special circum-
stances, the rejection by the claimant of an employer's unconditional
offer of the job previously denied ends the accrual of back pay liability.
The Court reasoned that tolling back pay upon such a rejection was in
keeping with Title VII's primary goal of ending employment discrimina-
tion by encouraging employers to compromise with claimants by making
unconditional job offers.8 0 Since the ADEA's primary goal is likewise to
end discrimination through compromise wherever possible, Ford has
been the basis for a number of subsequent ADEA decisions. 8 1
B. Title VII Standard of Mitigation: Giandonato v. Sybron Corporation
Relying on Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, the Tenth Circuit held in Gi-
andonato v. Sybron Corp.8 2 that the plaintiff's rejection of reinstatement
offers made by the employer ended the accrual of back pay damages.
8 3
By so holding, the Tenth Circuit reinforced the ADEA's primary goal of
sion of the legislative history of ADEA remedies, see Note, Set-offs Against Back Pay Awards
Under the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 79 MIcH. L. REV. 1113 (1981).
76. The Supreme Court confirmed the adoption of FLSA remedies by the ADEA in
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978), holding that the ADEA provided for a jury trial via
its express incorporation of FLSA remedies.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
78. See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 748 F.2d 1543 (11 th Cir.
1984); Dickerson v. DeLuxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1983); Cowan v.
Standard Brands, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 1576 (N.D. Al. S.D. 1983); Fiedler v. Indianhead
Truck Line, 670 F.2d 806 (8th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600 (10th Cir.
1980); Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655 (W.D. Va. 1977); see also
Note, Set-Offs Against Back Pay Awards Under the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 79
MICH. L. REV. 1113 (1981).
79. 458 U.S. 219, 241 (1982).
80. Id. at 228. For criticism of Ford, see Note, Ford Motor Company v. EEOC: A Setback for
Victims of Discrimination, 44 U. Prrr. L. REV. 707 (1983).
81. See, e.g., Cowan v. Standard Brands, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 1576 (N.D. Al. S.D. 1983)
(employee's refusal of reinstatement offer ended accrual of back pay); Dickerson v.
DeLuxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1983) (employer's job offer did not
toll accrual of back pay where job not substantially equivalent to job originally sought).
82. 804 F.2d 120 (10th Cir. 1986).
83. Id. at 125.
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ending discrimination through compromise. As stated in Ford, "the vic-
tims ofjob discrimination want jobs, not lawsuits." '8 4 Thus damages are
a secondary remedy intended to compensate victims of discrimination
when employers are unwilling to eliminate discriminatory practices.
The plaintiff in Giandonato worked as a salesman for Sybron for over
fourteen years when, due to a slow period in the industry, Sybron of-
fered Giandonato his choice of early retirement or a three month proba-
tion. Giandonato resigned and filed suit under the ADEA complaining
he had been harassed and constructively fired by Sybron based on his
age.8 5 Following Giandonato's resignation, Sybron paid him severance
pay, commenced pension benefits, and extended his insurance coverage
in order to allow coverage for his terminally ill wife. After the filing of
the complaint, Sybron offered to reinstate Giandonato three times, ulti-
mately offering to reinstate him without loss of service time, without a
probationary period, under a different supervisor, and without Gi-
andonato's repayment of severance pay.8 6 Sybron argued that Gi-
andonato's rejection of their reinstatement offers forfeited his right to
back pay under the ruling of Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC. Giandonato ar-
gued, however, that he was entitled to reject the offers of reinstatement
due to special circumstances. The circumstances claimed by Gi-
andonato were that the offers contained uncertainties, his wife was ter-
minally ill, and his supervisor was unsatisfactory.8 7 After a jury verdict
awarded Giandonato $327,357.00 in damages, the Tenth Circuit of Ap-
peals reversed.
1. Analysis
In deciding Giandonato, the Tenth Circuit relied exclusively on Title
VII precedent, presumably due to the absence of mitigation provisions
in both the ADEA and the FLSA. Furthermore, the court characterized
Ford as a "mandate" requiring ADEA claimants to minimize damages by
accepting reinstatement offers that are "substantially equivalent" to the
previous job.8 8 It was undisputed that Sybron had made bona fide, un-
conditional reinstatement offers to Giandonato which were substantially
equivalent to his former job and that he had rejected them.
Under the Title VII standard, then, the ultimate issue resolved by
the court was whether Giandonato rightfully rejected Sybron's offers
based on special circumstances. The court relied on two ADEA cases in
holding that Giandonato's circumstances did not comply with the Title
VII standard and did not justify his refusal of Sybron's offers.8 9 In Fied-
ler v. Indianhead Truck Line, Inc. ,90 the Eighth Circuit held that an em-
ployee was not entitled to reject a reinstatement offer because he wanted
84. 458 U.S. at 230.
85. 804 F.2d at 121.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 122.
88. Id. at 124.
89. Id.
90. 670 F.2d 806 (8th Cir. 1982).
[Vol. 65:4
CIVIL RIGHTS
EEOC investigations to continue, was grieving over the death of his
wife, and did not want to give up a new job.9 1 Likewise, the South Da-
kota District Court held in Cowan v. Standard Brands, Inc.92 that an em-
ployee was not entitled to refuse an offer because he did not believe it
bona fide and his feelings were hurt.93 The Tenth Circuit further rea-
soned that since Sybron agreed at Giandonato's request to additional
conditions, the negative effect of Giandonato's refusal was "magni-
fied."' 94 Significantly, Sybron's offer included no loss of seniority, a con-
dition which the Supreme Court expressly excluded under Ford.
9 5
2. Implications
Giandonato demonstrates that the Tenth Circuit will apply Title VII
standards of mitigation in cases brought under the ADEA. Considering
the lack of guidance provided by either the ADEA itself or the FLSA
concerning mitigation of damages by plaintiffs, this is the logical course
to take; however, an explanation to that effect would have been helpful
in clarifying why application of Title VII is necessary in the face of the
ADEA's explicit adoption of the FLSA remedies. Although the court
correctly applied Title VII, the reliance on Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC may
prove to be a mixed blessing for victims of age discrimination in the
Tenth Circuit. The basic rationale of Ford is that Title VII's primary
goal of eliminating discrimination is best met by encouraging employers
to compromise by offering unconditional reinstatement or employment
as often as possible. Damages are considered a secondary remedy appli-
cable only when employers refuse to comply.9 6 An analogous applica-
tion to the ADEA would likewise further the goal of getting and keeping
people employed. However, the question is whether plaintiffs who must
rely on damages for relief will be fairly compensated under Ford's hold-
ing that seniority need not be included in a job offer. In situations
where a claimant has begun another job before the defendant employer
makes an offer of reinstatement not including retroactive seniority, the
claimant may be forced to choose between refusing the offer to retain
some measure of seniority at the new job thereby cutting off damages
from the defendant, and accepting the defendant's offer thereby sacrific-
ing seniority. 9 7 Particularly because claimants in ADEA cases are more
likely to have built up considerable seniority, such sacrifices could be
extreme. Finally, allowing employers to make reinstatement offers lack-
ing retroactive seniority could affect the deterrent aspect of the ADEA
91. Id. at 808-09.
92. 572 F. Supp 1576 (N.D. Al. 1983).
93. Id. at 1581.
94. 804 F.2d at 124-25. Sybron agreed to: fully reinstate Giandonato with no reduc-
tion in salary or loss of service; hire a new district manager; make no changes in Gi-
andonato's territory, accounts, or sales quotas except by written agreement; and require
no repayment of severance pay Giandonato had received.
95. 458 U.S. at 232.
96. Id. at 230.
97. See Note, supra note 80, at 726-27.
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because potential damages to employers are greatly reduced.98 Thus,
employers who chose to take a "wait and see" attitude would not be as
effectively discouraged from discriminating against employees on the
basis of age.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
A. Background
Public employees are guaranteed freedom of speech under the first
amendment of the United States Constitution9 9 and its application to
the states through the fourteenth amendment. 10 0 This guarantee was
not recognized by the Supreme Court until relatively recently, however.
Under the "right-privilege doctrine," the courts formerly considered
public employment a privilege that the government could withhold re-
gardless of first amendment rights. 10 ' In a series of cases beginning with
Pickering v. Board of Education 102 the United States Supreme Court has
defined the application of first amendment rights to public employ-
ees. ' 0 3 Under Pickering, an employee's exercise of the right to speak on
issues of public concern could not be the basis of dismissal. 10 4 The
Court also adopted the defamation standard established in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 10 5 holding that when an employee made statements
with knowledge of their falsity or reckless disregard for their truth or
falsity, the adverse action would be upheld. 10 6 The most pervasive as-
pect of the Court's holding in Pickering, however, was the emphasis on a
98. Id. at 719.
99. The first amendment states in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
100. The fourteenth amendment states:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. U.S. Const. amend. XIV,
§ 1.
101. SeeJustice Holme's discussion of the doctrine in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bed-
ford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892), and the rejection of the doctrine in Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). For general discussions of the right-privilege
doctrine, see Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81
HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968); Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1611, 1741-44 (1984).
102. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). In Pickering, a public school teacher was dismissed after writ-
ing a letter to the editor of the local newspaper criticizing the allocation of school funds
and the concealment of information regarding tax revenues by the school board.
103. See Developments in the Law--Public Employment, supra note 101; Eagle, First Amend-
ment Protectionfor Teachers Who Criticize Academic Policy: Biting the Hand that Feeds You, 68 CHI.[-
]KENT L. REV. 229 (1984); Lieberwitz, Freedom of Speech in Public Sector Employment: The Decon-
stitutionalization of the Public Sector Workplace, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 597 (1986).
104. 391 U.S. at 574.
105. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
106. 391 U.S. at 574. For discussion of Pickering, see Recent Decisions, Constitutional
Law: Balancing Test Applied to Teacher's Criticism of School Board, 35 BROOKLYN L. REV. 270




balancing of interests between the employee and the state. 0 7
The Supreme Court refined the requirements set forth in Pickering
in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle. 10 8 Since the
teacher in Mt. Healthy had a controversial record of prior behavior, the
Court sought to avoid placing the teacher in a better position simply by
virtue of his exercise of first amendment rights. Therefore, the Court
held that once the employee has established that the disputed speech
was both constitutionally protected and a motivating factor in the em-
ployer's action, the burden of proof then shifts to the employer to show
that the action would have been taken as a result of other factors regard-
less of the protected speech.' 0 9 Two years later, the Supreme Court
increased the first amendment protection afforded public employees in
Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District "10 by holding that private
as well as public communications between employee and employer are
protected. I I In so holding, however, the Court required that when pri-
vate speech is at issue, the time, place, and manner of its delivery are
relevant.' 12
Connick v. Myers113 represented a significant narrowing of first
amendment protection for public employees. In a frequently criticized
decision, the Supreme Court strictly construed the meaning of the "mat-
ters of public concern" standard announced in Pickering."14 The Court
held that a questionnaire about working conditions in the office distrib-
uted by a district attorney was not involved with matters of public con-
cern, but was an extension of an internal dispute not entitled to
protection under the first amendment. '5 The Court reasoned that the
issue of whether an employee's speech was a matter of public concern
should be determined as a matter of law by its "content, form and con-
107. 391 U.S. at 568. The Court stated, "[tlhe problem in any case is to arrive at a
balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of
public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of
the public services it performs through its employees." The Court noted that the need for
confidentiality and the effectiveness of working relationships were two factors which could
be considered relative to the state interest. Id. at 570 n. 3.
108. 429 U.S. 274 (1977). In Mt. Healthy a teacher called a local radio station and di-
vulged information from an administrative memorandum concerning teacher dress and
appearance which was then broadcast as a news item. The teacher was subsequently repri-
manded and not recommended for rehiring.
109. Id. at 285-87. For discussion of Mt. Healthy, see Lane, The Effect of Mt. Healthy City
School District v. Doyle Upon Public Sector Labor Law: An Employer's Perspective, 10J.L. & EDUC.
509 (1981); Wolly, What Hath Mt. Healthy Wrought?, 41 OHIo ST. L. J. 385 (1980).
110. 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
Il. Id. at 415-16.
112. Id. at 415 n. 4. For discussion on Givhan, see Comment, Private Expression is Subject
to Constitutional Protection, 30 MERCER L. REv. 1079 (1979); Comment, First Amendment
Rights-Public Employees May Speak a Little Evil, 3 W. NEw ENGL. L. REV. 289 (1980).
113. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
114. 391 U.S. at 568; see supra note 107.
115. 461 U.S. at 147, 149-50. Matters addressed by the questionnaire included: confi-
dence and trust in supervisors, office morale, need for a grievance committee, and pres-
sure to work in political campaigns. In a single exception to their holding, the Court
stated that the issue of pressure to work in political campaigns was a matter of public
concern, but declined to give the entire questionnaire constitutional protection solely on
that basis.
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text... as revealed by the whole record." 16 The Court then concluded
that, balanced against the state's interest in the efficient operation of the
district attorney's office, the plaintiff's "limited First Amendment inter-
est" did not require that her employer tolerate expressions which he
reasonably felt would disrupt office functions and working relation-
ships.' 17 Thus, Connick effectively shifted the balance of interests in
favor of public employers by demanding that the "matters of public con-
cern" standard be strictly construed.
Tenth Circuit decisions on first amendment issues have relied on
the landmark decisions of Pickering and Mt. Healthy, focusing primarily
on the Pickering balancing test. In Childers v. Independent School District No.
1 of Bryan County, 118 National Gay Task Force v. Board of Education of the City
of Oklahoma City, 119 and Saye v. St. Vrain Valley School District RE- 1J, 120 the
Tenth Circuit balanced the need to protect public employees' first
amendment rights against the disruptive effect of first amendment ex-
pressions on official functions. In addition, the Tenth Circuit consid-
ered Connick when establishing whether expressions were matters of
public concern in Saye 12 ' and Wilson v. City of Littleton.1
22
B. Balancing of Interests
1. Wren v. Spurlock
Chiefly following the balancing of interests standard set forth in
Pickering, the Tenth Circuit held in Wren v. Spurlock 123 that a public
school teacher's first amendment rights were violated by her principal
when he harassed her in retaliation for her statements to the Wyoming
116. Id. at 147-48.
117. Id. at 154.
118. 676 F.2d 1338 (10th Cir. 1982). Childers involved the claim of a teacher that the
School Board had reassigned him in retaliation for his support of a candidate for the
Board and his activity involving union organization. The court stated in dictum that al-
tered employment conditions could be considered an unconstitutional infringement of
protected first amendment activity. Id. at 1342.
119. 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984). National Gay Task Force involved the challenge of
certain Oklahoma statutes proscribing homosexual activity and advocacy by public school
teachers. The court held that Okla. Stat. tit. 70, § 6-103.25 prohibiting the advocacy, en-
couragement, or promotion of homosexual activity was unconstitutionally overbroad. Id.
at 1274.
120. 785 F.2d 862 (10th Cir. 1986). Saye involved the claim of a teacher that the school
district had not renewed her teaching contract in retaliation for her criticism of the alloca-
tion of teacher aide time and her activities as a union representative. The court held that
the criticism was "tangential to a matter of public concern" and sufficiently disruptive to
foreclose first amendment protection. Id. at 866. The court held further that the plain-
tiff's union activities were entitled to protection and that a question of fact had been raised
as to whether the union activities were a motivating factor in her non-renewal. Id. at 867.
121. Id. at 866.
122. 732 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1984). Wilson involved the claim of a policeman that his
termination for refusal to obey an order to remove a black shroud on his badge was an
unconstitutional infringement of his first amendment rights. The court held that the wear-
ing of the shroud to express grief and solidarity over the death of a police officer from
another town was an expression of a "personal feeling of grief" which was not a matter of
public concern. Furthermore, the court stated that unless the expression is a matter of
public concern, the Pickering balancing test is not reached. Id. at 769.
123. 798 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir. 1986).
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Education Association. The decision demonstrates the ability of this
Tenth Circuit panel of Judges McKay, McWilliams and Logan, to apply
accurately and fairly the precedents of the major Supreme Court cases in
this area to date: Pickering, Mt. Healthy and Connick.
The plaintiff, Lois Wren, taught for several years at the only public
school in Baggs, Wyoming, where the defendant, Nyles Spurlock, was
the principal. Although their professional relationship over the years
was at best strained, it deteriorated significantly in April of 1980 when
Wren and nine other teachers requested in a letter containing some
thirty-five separate issues that the Wyoming Education Association
(WEA) investigate Spurlock.1 2 4 Following the district teachers' associa-
tion's endorsement of the request for investigation, Wren was sus-
pended with pay for a half day, and following the WEA investigation of
Spurlock, which resulted in a reprimand, Spurlock recommended that
Wren's contract not be renewed. The school board rejected Spurlock's
recommendation and granted Wren's request for a leave of absence
without pay on the advice of her psychiatrist. Subsequently, the school
board denied an extension of the leave, but never formally acted on
Wren's status even though she did not return to teach. 12 5 Wren then
brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983126 against Spurlock,
the school district, and the superintendent alleging they retaliated
against her for her exercise of first amendment rights. The school dis-
trict and the superintendent settled with Wren for $125,000 and were
dismissed from the action, and a jury awarded Wren $113,000 compen-
satory and $7,500 punitive damages against Spurlock.1 2 7 The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
a. Analysis
In affirming the district court decision, the Tenth Circuit faithfully
followed both its own precedent' 2 8 and that of the Supreme Court. The
court expressed its standard as a basic two-step process derived from
Mt. Healthy and Pickering under which the plaintiff must show (1) the
speech was protected under the first amendment, and (2) the speech was
a motivating factor in the employer's negative action. 129 Under the first
step, which the court emphasized must be decided as a matter of law, '
30
protection under the first amendment applies only if the speech is a mat-
124. Id. at 1316.
125. Id.
126. The statute states in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State .... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
127. 798 F.2d at 1315-16.
128. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
129. 798 F.2d at 1317.
130. Id. (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. at 148 n. 7, 150 n. 10). The Supreme Court
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ter of public concern and if the constitutional right outweighs the em-
ployer's right to control official functions. 13 ' The court reasoned that
under Connick the contents of the teachers' letter to the WEA were mat-
ters of public concern due to the small size of the town and the relative
importance of the public school. 13 2 The court then applied the basic
balancing test of Pickering and reasoned that since school officials were
apparently satisfied with Wren's teaching performance, her statements
did not sufficiently disrupt official functions to preclude their protection
under the first amendment. 133 Although this issue erroneously went to
the jury at the trial level, the court of appeals ruled no reversible error
had occurred because they agreed with the outcome as decided by the
jury. 1
34
Having established that Wren's statements were constitutionally
protected, the court went on to examine whether the speech was a moti-
vating factor in Wren's adverse treatment. The court stated that Wren
presented sufficient evidence on the issue for the jury to reasonably con-
clude that her first amendment activity was at least a substantial motivat-
ing factor in Spurlock's actions.' 3 5 Unlike the first step, the court
pointed out that the motivation issue was properly one of fact for the
jury. 13 6 The remaining issue under Mt. Healthy of whether the employer
would have reached the same result due to factors other than the pro-
tected speech' 37 was not litigated in this case presumably because the
defendants disagreed over Wren's quality of teaching performance.
b. Implications
The decision in Wren v. Spurlock indicates that the Tenth Circuit is
capable of applying the Connick limitations to "matters of public con-
cern" without emasculating the first amendment rights of public em-
ployees. Particularly in situations where views of public employment
may still conjure up remnants of the "right-privilege" doctrine and first
amendment rights may consequently receive less than full consideration,
a cautious interpretation of Connick is critical to their survival. Thus, to
assure the future relative security of first amendment rights for public
employees in the Tenth Circuit, the court should continue to pursue the
prudent, well-crafted reasoning of Wren v. Spurlock.
stated explicitly that both elements of the first step should be decided as a matter of law
and that the second step should be decided as a matter of fact.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1317-18. The issues presented in the WEA letter included complaints of
high teacher turnover and sexual harassment of students and teachers. Furthermore, the
letter was signed by a majority of the school's teachers.
133. Id. at 1318.
134. Id.
135. The facts pointed to several connections between Wren's conduct and Spurlock's
actions. Wren was suspended the day after the district association endorsed the. WEA
investigation; she was recommended for non-renewal approximately two months after
Spurlock's reprimand; and she was more frequently remanded by Spurlock after the WEA
letter.
136. See supra note 130.
137. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
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2. Ewers v. Board of County Commissioners of the County of Curry
a. Summary
Since the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed both a first
amendment issue and a deprivation of liberty issue in Ewers v. Board of
County Commissioners of the County of Curry, 13 8 the facts of the case will be
presented first. The plaintiff, Walter Ewers, was employed from 1977 to
1981 by Curry County, New Mexico, as road superintendent to super-
vise road maintenance and advise the Commission on related matters.
Two members of the three member Board of County Commissioners,
Gattis and Merrill, were elected in November of 1980 after campaigning
for increased efficiency of county government, improved roads, and the
elimination of the road superintendent position. Consequently, after
Gattis and Merrill assumed office on January 1, 1981, the Board de-
clined to rehire Ewers and subsequently eliminated the position of road
superintendent, effective March 1, 1981.139 At the following meeting of
February 2, 1981, the Board told Ewers that it was concerned with the
amount of time taken to complete certain "co-op" projects with the
State Highway Department, and agreed to meet with officials from the
State Department at its next meeting to discuss the issue. Thereafter, at
the February 10, 1981 meeting, Merrill stated that "someone was 'drag-
ging out' the co-op projects and 'padding the books.' ,,140 Ewers re-
plied that the statement was false, and a State Highway Department
employee stated that "he did not believe that anyone had been
dishonest."'
14 1
Following his termination as road superintendent, Ewers was un-
successful at finding employment after considerable effort. He acknowl-
edged that poor health, a limited education, and age were contributing
factors in his inability to find a job. 1 42 Ewers subsequently brought an
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983143 against the Board of County Commis-
sioners, and Gattis and Merrill individually, alleging that he was termi-
nated in retaliation for his exercise of speech under the first
amendment, that he had been deprived of equal protection by a conspir-
acy of the Board, that he had been deprived of a liberty interest in his
reputation by the Board, and that he had been deprived of a property
interest without due process by the Board. 144 Only the first amendment
and liberty interest issues went to trial; Ewers was awarded general dam-
ages of $160,000 by the jury and attorneys' fees of $39,500 by the court.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the general verdict and judgment
138. 802 F.2d 1242 (10th Cir. 1986).
139. Id. at 1244. The Board refused to rehire Ewers at theJanuary 5, 1981 meeting
and abolished the road superintendent position at the January 19, 1981 meeting. County
employees could only be terminated for good cause or due to the elimination of a position.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1245.
142. Id.
143. See supra note 126.
144. 802 F.2d at 1245. The defendants were granted summary judgment by the trial
court on the claims of conspiracy and deprivation of a property interest.
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of the jury as well as the court order for attorneys' fees. 14 5
b. The First Amendment Claim
i. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit held that the first amendment instruction submit-
ted to the jury by the trial court was overbroad in that it did not specifi-
cally identify the speech at issue. Thus, the court concluded that the
jury had insufficient facts for a damage award based on the first amend-
ment. 1 4 6 The court reasoned that in order for the jury to determine
whether the protected speech was a motivating factor in Ewer's termina-
tion as required by Mt. Healthy 147 the jury must have precise knowledge
of the nature of the protected speech. 148 The court based this conclu-
sion on the appropriate jury instruction, but pointed out that the rele-
vant evidentiary materials were not considered because they were not
included in the record on appeal. 14 9 Thus, the court concluded that
there was insufficient evidence for an award of damages based solely on
the instruction, not on the record as a whole which would indicate the
complete basis for the jury's decision.
An error in jury instructions distinct from the question of over-
breadth was not addressed by the Tenth Circuit. Under Connick, the is-
sue of whether the plaintiff's interest in protected speech outweighs the
employer's interest in efficiency of operation is to be decided as a matter
of law by the court, not as a matter of fact by the jury.' 50 In the instant
case, the court failed to point out that the trial court erroneously submit-
ted that element to the jury. 15 1 Although the trial court's error was a
possible basis for reversal at the appellate level, the Tenth Circuit's fail-
ure to address the error resulted in an inconsistent application of first
amendment precedent.
ii. Implications
The opinion in Ewers demonstrates that adjudication of first amend-
ment rights is a vastly inconsistent area in the Tenth Circuit. Whereas
the panel deciding Wren v. Spurlock 152 gave careful, step-by-step consid-
eration to applicable precedent in reaching a well-reasoned decision, the
panel in Ewers 153 gave cursory, inaccurate consideration to precedent
145. Id. at 1245, 1250.
146. Id. at 1247.
147. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
148. 802 F.2d at 1246.
149. Id.
150. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
151. 802 F.2d at 1246. Jury instruction number three read: "[the Plaintiff must estab-
lish] . . . [t]hat Plaintiff's interest in commenting upon matters of public concern out-
weighed the Defendants' interest in restricting Plaintiff's expression of his views because
such expression hampered or obstructed the efficient operation of the Road Department."
Id.
152. 798 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir. 1986). The panel consisted of McKay, McWilliams, and
Logan, Circuit Judges.
153. 802 F.2d 1242. The panel consisted of Holloway, Chief Judge, Barrett, Circuit
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and the record in reaching a decision which is at best questionable as to
its fairness. Remand would have been a far more thoughtful and equita-
ble solution to the poor record and improper instructions which were
the basis of the trial court's decision. The public employees residing
and working in the Tenth Circuit deserve as much.
c. Liberty Interest
i. Analysis
The court held that there was insufficient evidence to support the
jury verdict awarding damages for the deprivation of a liberty interest in
reputation and accordingly reversed the trial court's denial of a directed
verdict. In reaching this decision, the court followed the two-part stan-
dard of McGhee v. Draper 154 to determine what constitutes deprivation of
a liberty interest. First, the complained of action must have stigmatized
or otherwise damaged the plaintiff's reputation, and second, such dam-
age must have been involved with a tangible interest such as employ-
ment.155 Once reputational damage associated with employment has
been established, the plaintiff must be afforded a hearing to clear his
name. 1 56 Under McGhee, the constitutional sufficiency of such a hearing
is to be determined by the court as a matter of law. 1 57 Once again, the
Ewers court failed to point out that the trial court erroneously submitted
this issue to the jury.
1 58
The court of appeals then analyzed the liberty issue in terms of the
five-part jury instruction given by the trial court. 1 59 No precise author-
ity for the jury instruction was stated although in a general sense the
elements could be extrapolated from McGhee. After determining that
Ewers had satisfied the first two elements of the jury instruction, the
court stated that he had failed to prove, under the third element, a con-
nection between the Board's accusations and the elimination of the posi-
tion, because the accusations came after the official elimination of the
job.160 Contrary to the court's holding, time sequence of such a connec-
judge, and Sam, United States District judge for the District of Utah, sitting by
designation.
154. 639 F.2d at 639, 643 (10th Cir. 1981).
155. 802 F.2d at 1247.
156. See Curry, Name Clearing Hearings: Two Wrongs Make a Right, 14 URB. LAW. 303
(1982); Price, Name-Clearing Hearings: Public Interest Versus Personal Liberty, 16 COLO. LAW.
253 (1987); Toman, Practical Considerations for Liberty Interest Hearings in Public Employee Dis-
missals, 14 URB. LAw. 325 (1982).
157. 639 F.2d at 643.
158. 802 F.2d at 1248. See also supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
159. 802 F.2d at 1248. The instruction read:
Ewers . . . must prove . . . that: (1) defendants falsely accused him of padding
time records and dragging out cooperative road projects; (2) the accusations were
made in public; (3) the accusations were made in connection with the abolition of
his job; (4) the accusations stigmatized him and effected [sic] his future employ-
ment opportunities; and, (5) the defendants deprived him of an opportunity for a
hearing at which he could defend against the stigma which added injury to his
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tion is irrelevant, and the jury had sufficient facts to believe such a con-
nection existed. '
6 1
Under the fourth element, the court ruled that Ewers had not
proved that the statements stigmatized him and affected his ability to
obtain employment. For the concept of stigmatization, the court relied
on Asbill v. Housing Authority of Choctaw Nation 162 stating that in order for
statements to be stigmatizing, "they must rise to such a serious level as
to place the employee's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity at
stake."' 63 The court then conceded that the Board's false accusations
that Ewers had been "padding the books" and "dragging out" coopera-
tive projects were stigmatizing under the Asbill standard, but held that
the statements did not have the "general effect of curtailing" his em-
ployment opportunities under the trial court's instruction. 164 It is diffi-
cult indeed to understand how such clearly damaging and stigmatizing
statements could fail to have, at the very least, a "curtailing" effect on
future employment in a predominantly rural area where job opportuni-
ties tend to be scarce in the first place.' 6 5 Furthermore, there is no re-
quirement under Asbill or McGhee that stigmatizing statements be the
exclusive factor affecting employment opportunities; the McGhee court,
relying on the Board of Regents v. Roth, 16 6 stated that a liberty interest had
been violated where employment opportunities were "diminished."'
67
Thus, the Tenth Circuit failed to properly consider the effect of state-
ments it agreed were stigmatizing on the plaintiff's employment
opportunities.
Finally, the court concluded that Ewers had not proved that he was
denied an opportunity for a hearing to clear his name. 168 Although the
court reasoned that Ewers had sufficient notice of the accusations and an
adequate opportunity to respond to them, this failed to meet the stan-
dards set under the precedent of McGhee. The McGhee court affirmed as
law of the case an earlier court of appeals decision holding that the
plaintiff had not been given a sufficient opportunity for a hearing to
clear her name. 169 Under McGhee I the necessary due process factors for
a name-clearing hearing include reasonable notice of the substance of
the charges, opportunity to confront and cross-examine the accusers,
and indication of the proof relied on by the accusers.170 Although Ew-
ers had an opportunity to confront and cross-examine his accusers at the
Board meeting of February 10, 1981, there was no adequate notice of
161. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
162. 726 F.2d 1499 (10th Cir. 1984).
163. 802 F.2d at 1249 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972)).
The case actually quoted language from Asbill v. Housing Authority of Choctaw Nation,
726 F.2d 1499, 1503 (10th Cir. 1984).
164. 802 F.2d at 1249.
165. Curry County is located in eastern New Mexico, on the Texas border. Its county
seat is Clovis, population 31,000.
166. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
167. 639 F.2d at 643.
168. 802 F.2d at 1249.
169. 639 F.2d at 643, aff'd in part, 564 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1977).
170. 564 F.2d at 911-12.
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the substance of the charges because the accusations of "padding the
books" and "dragging out" the cooperative projects were made at the
same meeting. Thus, Ewers had no opportunity to prepare a response
or consult counsel regarding the statements.1 7 1 Additionally, there is
no indication that any evidence was offered by the Board supporting its
charges. Thus, the Board's meeting of February 10, 1981, failed to meet
the due process requirements of reasonable notice and indication of
proof. Furthermore, the sufficiency of the February 10th meeting as a
name-clearing hearing should have been decided as a matter of law by
the trial court.
ii. Implications
The Tenth Circuit's conclusion that there was no violation of a lib-
erty interest in reputation was based on an inaccurate application of the
Tenth Circuit precedent of Asbill and McGhee. The court effectively ig-
nored the facts of the case and affirmed the dismissal of an employee
which occurred under circumstances smacking of personal or political
vendetta.172 The decision amounts to a deplorable abuse of the very
due process liberty rights of which public employees in the plaintiff's
position are so desperately in need.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed a variety of
civil rights issues during the survey period. The task of applying and
reconciling the myriad federal civil rights statutes is often complex due
to their interdependence and overlap. The affirmation of no discrimina-
tion in Thomas set a precedent in the Tenth Circuit concerning no-
spouse rules, but the court left the door open for further challenge. The
effectiveness of Title IX employment claims was potentially strength-
ened by the Mabry court's decision to allow the application of Title VII
substantive standards to such claims. No other court of appeals to date
has so clearly endorsed that approach, and the decision represents the
Tenth Circuit's boldest effort of the survey period.
On the other hand, the court held a predictable and conservative
171. No further Board meetings are reported to have addressed the matters relevant to
the instant case. Although the plaintiff did not request further hearings, the court stated
that "[n]one were necessary under these facts." 802 F.2d at 1249. In McGhee I, the plaintiff
was similarly aware of rumors against her, but had no notice of specific allegations prior to
the hearing in front of the school board where the accusations were made. The court
stated that [a] hearing where the plaintiff was faced with such a blast of complaints, and
not knowing which incidents she needed to discuss, did not satisfy due process." 564 F.2d
at 911.
172. In addition to the fact that Commissioner Merrill stated in her campaign that the
county did not need a road superintendent, Commissioner Stockton informed Ewers that
he thought Merrill did not like Ewers. 802 F.2d at 1244. Furthermore, the duties of the
road superintendent were included in the newly created job of county manager, which
required a college degree, and in the jobs of the district crew foremen. Id. at 1245. Thus,
it is questionable whether abolishing the position of road superintendent actually saved
the county money.
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course in examining the role of mitigation in ADEA claims in Giandonato
by closely following the Supreme Court's ruling in Ford Motor Co. v.
EEOC. Although the opinion followed precedent logically, it also
demonstrated the Tenth Circuit's unwillingness to question or limit the
holding in Ford.
The Ewers court turned out a disappointing decision in its reversal
of both a deprivation of a liberty interest in a reputation claim and a first
amendment claim by basing its poorly crafted decision on the inaccurate
application of important principles of case law. In contrast, the court in
Wren produced a conservative but careful and protective application of
precedent to a first amendment issue. As a result, first amendment
claimants are justified in approaching the Tenth Circuit with extreme
prudence.
Martha Cox
